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INTRODUCTION
There is nothing “extraordinary” or “unusual,” Pet. 4, about the
panel opinions in this case.
What is extraordinary is seeking en banc review of decisions that
turn entirely on Ninth Circuit law. This Court has never granted
rehearing en banc to consider a regional circuit’s law. It simply does
not satisfy the criteria for en banc review.
Equally unusual is Google’s effort to seek review of a four-year-old
decision in an earlier appeal that held Oracle’s work copyrightable.
Google skipped the rehearing petition when that appeal was decided
and failed to convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. As the
United States explained to the Court, the decision was “correct[],” and
Google “identified no sound basis for further review.” Brief of United
States, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 14-410, 2015 WL 2457656, at
*19. Google recycles the same arguments here, which warrant the same
result.
Google also seeks review of the panel’s current ruling that
Google’s unlicensed commercial use of Oracle’s copyrighted work was
not fair use. Google labels this decision “extraordinary” based on a
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tweet claiming that “of the more than 300 decisions on fair use … only
one other decision overturn[ed] a jury verdict on fair use.” Pet. 4. But
Google fails to mention that hardly any of those cases went to a jury.
By our count, there have been exactly five JMOL appeals from fair use
jury verdicts in the last 24 years. Resolving fair use as a matter of law
is the norm.
It is certainly proper on such extreme facts: Oracle spent years
writing packages of elegant software for the Java platform that
appealed to a fan base of millions of app developers. Google then copied
11,500 lines of that expressive code into a competing platform for the
express purpose of capturing Oracle’s fan base and competing against
Oracle in the market. Google’s copying was the equivalent of taking the
most recognizable parts of a popular short story and turning them into
a blockbuster movie without the author’s permission—something the
Supreme Court deemed a “classic” unfair use. Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 238 (1990). No court has ever held that it could be fair to copy
this much original material and incorporate it into a competing product
that displaces the original.

2

Case: 17-1118

Document: 300

Page: 11

Filed: 07/27/2018

That is why Google and its amici are wrong in predicting that the
panel opinion will undermine software innovation. The panel followed
existing law. Google’s premise has always been that it may copy
Oracle’s original code precisely because it has become wildly popular.
Oracle I, 750 F.3d 1339, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014). That principle is foreign
to copyright law—and anathema to innovation. No software company
will ever invest the millions of dollars necessary to create such an
innovative platform if competitors are free to plagiarize when it
becomes popular.
This Court should deny Google’s petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Oracle and its predecessor, Sun Microsystems, created and
continuously improved the Java platform to appeal to a community of
developers who write their own apps. Relevant here are the Java
platform’s thousands of prewritten programs known as application
programming interfaces or “APIs” that “programmers … use … to build
certain functions into their own programs.” Op. 8.
The Java APIs contain both “declaring code” and “implementing
code.” “Declaring code” (what Google copied verbatim) is like the

3
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chapter headings and topic sentences of an elaborate literary work: It
introduces, names, and describes each pre-written program to help app
developers learn and remember what those pre-written programs do,
and how they interrelate, while writing their own code. App developers
invoke the declaring code to incorporate a desired prewritten program
into an app. Each portion of declaring code is associated with particular
“implementing code,” which tells the computer how to perform the prewritten function. Id.
“[D]esigning the Java API packages was a creative process.”
Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1356. Oracle painstakingly wrote expressive
declaring code and organized the programs into an intricate structure
and organization—all with a view toward making the platform
attractive and intuitive to a vast fan base of millions of app developers.
None of these creative choices were dictated by function. Id.
Google likes to say that Oracle’s code was “free and open” for all to
use. Pet. 6. But Oracle made its code available only by license. Op. 9.
App developers who used the platform to write apps could take a nonroyalty-bearing license. But critically, Oracle never let competitors or
device manufacturers freely copy its code to build competing platforms.

4
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Id. Before Google began marketing Android using Oracle’s work, Oracle
successfully licensed the Java platform for desktop and laptop
computers, as well as for smartphones (like Danger), for tablets (like
Amazon Kindle), and for development of a smartphone platform
(SavaJe). Op. 51-52.
The panel’s opinion lays out Google’s brazen copying in full color.
Op. 10-11. To summarize: In 2005, Google wanted to quickly develop a
programming platform for mobile devices to protect its revenue from
search-engine advertising. Google needed to attract Java developers to
build apps for it. Op. 10. To speed the development and adoption of its
platform—Android—Google copied 11,500 lines of Oracle’s declaring
code and the exact structure and organization of the 37 API packages
most relevant to attract Java mobile-app developers. Id. Google also
made Android incompatible with Java so that apps written for Android
would not run on the Java platform. Op. 47 n.11. Android generated
over $42 billion for Google as of 2016. It cost Oracle existing customers
and blocked its entry into developing markets. Op. 10-11, 51-53.
Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement. The original jury
found Google infringed Oracle’s copyright but hung on fair use.

5

Case: 17-1118

Document: 300

Page: 14

Filed: 07/27/2018

Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1347-48. After trial, the district court held the
code Google copied devoid of copyright protection. Id. In 2014, this
Court reversed, holding both Oracle’s declaring code and its structure
and organization subject to copyright protection. Id. Google did not
seek rehearing but petitioned for certiorari. The United States, as
amicus, opposed Google’s petition. The Supreme Court denied it.
The case returned to district court for a retrial on Google’s fair-use
defense. The second jury concluded that Google’s use was fair, and the
district court denied Oracle’s JMOL motion. Op. 7. Oracle appealed,
and the panel reversed. The panel “assume[d] that the jury resolved all
factual issues relating to the historical facts in favor of the verdict” and,
following Ninth Circuit law, carefully analyzed each of the fair-use
factors in light of those historical facts. Op. 25.
Based upon undisputed facts, the panel concluded that factor one
(the purpose and character of the copied use) weighed against fair use.
Google’s use was “overwhelmingly commercial.” Op. 28-30. And it was
not “transformative” because Google “made no alteration to the
expressive content or message of the copyrighted material” and used it
for the “same … purpose” in the same “smartphone[] … context.” Op.

6
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30-39. The second factor (the nature of the copied work) weighed in
Google’s favor, Op. 44, and the third (the amount taken) was neutral or
favored Oracle, given the code’s conceded importance, Op. 44-48. The
fourth factor (harm to existing and potential markets) “weigh[ed]
heavily in favor of Oracle” in light of the unrebutted evidence that
Android caused Oracle to lose customers and impaired Oracle’s ability
to “license its work for mobile devices.” Op. 48-53.
“Weighing these factors together, [the panel] conclude[d] that
Google’s use of the declaring code and [structure and organization] of
the 37 API packages was not fair as a matter of law.” Op. 54.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Panel’s Application Of Ninth Circuit Law Does Not
Warrant Rehearing.
Last time, Google did not seek rehearing. And for good reason:

The question whether a panel of this Court correctly applied Ninth
Circuit law is not worthy of en banc review. This Court reserves its en
banc power for exceptional cases—those that present a need to “secure
or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or “precedent-setting
questions of exceptional importance.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1), Fed. Cir.
R. 35 (b)(2) (emphases added). Where the answer to a question will not
7
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“create a precedent,” en banc review is unwarranted. George E. Warren
Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A case
involving purely regional circuit law does not meet these criteria, and
Google does not seriously argue otherwise. Indeed, we have found no
instance of this Court ever reviewing en banc a question controlled by
regional circuit law.
Google proclaims the panel’s application of Ninth Circuit law “is
now a Federal Circuit problem,” because plaintiffs might increasingly
append patent claims to their copyright cases. Pet. 21. Google musters
only two examples in five years of this supposed problem. Id. It also
misses the point. Those cases will always be governed by the law of the
various regional circuits. They will never involve questions of Federal
Circuit law. Future panels will be required to reach the results dictated
by the relevant regional circuit regardless of what this Court holds en
banc.

8

Case: 17-1118

II.

Document: 300

Page: 17

Filed: 07/27/2018

The Panel’s 2014 Copyrightability Decision Does Not
Warrant Rehearing.
A.

This Court should not review an opinion that Google
declined to present for rehearing when it issued four
years ago.

Google’s lead argument challenges a 2014 decision resolving a
prior appeal in this litigation. “[L]aw of the case posits that when a
court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Dow Chem. Co.
v. Nova Chems. Corp. (Canada), 803 F.3d 620, 627 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(quotation marks omitted). Copyrightability became such a “decide[d]”
issue when Google declined to seek rehearing, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, and the parties pursued three years of fair-use
litigation premised on the correctness of that ruling. Google offers no
justification for skipping en banc review the first time and no reason
why this Court should revisit a now-final ruling.
Worse, Google presents to the en banc Court an argument that it
waived before the panel. Google argues that intervening Ninth Circuit
law undermines Oracle I. Pet. 10 (citing Bikram’s Yoga College of
India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015)). In the
latest appeal, Google included Bikram’s in a string cite before the panel,
9
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but chose neither to “ask[] the panel for relief on the copyrightability
issue nor offer[] any arguments on that issue.” Op. 55. This Court
should follow its usual practice and “decline to address the … new
theory raised for the first time in [Google’s] petition for rehearing.”
Pentax Corp. v. Robison, 135 F.3d 760, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
B.

Applying Ninth Circuit law, the panel correctly held
Oracle’s original work copyrightable.

As the United States explained to the Supreme Court, the panel’s
2014 copyrightability decision was “correct.” Supra 1.
“The Copyright Act provides protection to ‘original works of
authorship’”—which all agree include computer programs. Oracle I, 750
F.3d at 1354-55 (quoting § 102(a)). The panel held Oracle’s declaring
code, and the code’s structure and organization, copyright-protected
because they are creative expression that all agreed qualified as
original works under § 102(a). Id. at 1355-56.
Google contends that Oracle’s work is a “system” or “method of
operation” under § 102(b) and that the panel erred in holding that
§ “102(b) does not exclude systems or methods of operation from
copyright protection.” Pet. 8-9. That is not what the panel held.
Rather, following Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the
10
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panel recognized that § 102(b) does not extinguish the copyright
protection that § 102(a) grants. 750 F.3d at 1354-55; see Feist Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991) (§ 102(b) “in no
way … contracts the scope of copyright protection”; its “purpose is to
restate ... the basic dichotomy between expression and idea”); Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (9th
Cir. 1989) (software’s “structure, sequence, and organization” is
copyrightable if “the component in question qualifies as an expression of
an idea”). Section 102(b) means that just because a work has copyright
protection (under § 102(a)) does not mean the protection “extend[s]” to
the underlying “ideas,” “systems,” and “methods of operation” that the
author describes in the work. Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1355-57 (quoting
§ 102(b)). Because the declaring code and its structure and organization
were protected expression—not an idea, system, or method of
operation—the panel correctly held them copyrightable. Id.
Google is wrong that Oracle’s code is an uncopyrightable “method
of operat[ion]” because the code “instruct[s] a computer to carry out
desired operations.” Pet. 10. That would be true of all computer
programs. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “computer program[s],” as “a set of

11
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statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result”). So that rule would
nullify Congress’s decision to make computer programs copyrightable.
Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1367.
The Ninth Circuit cases Google and its amici cite are not to the
contrary. Pet. 10. The panel thoroughly considered Sega and Sony and
rejected Google’s argument for several reasons. Most notably—they are
not copyrightability decisions. Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1369.
Even if Google had preserved its argument about Bikram’s Yoga,
but see supra 9-10, it changes nothing. Bikram’s held that a “healing
methodology” comprised of a series of yoga poses was not copyrightable
because “medical and functional considerations” “compel[led]”
arranging the poses in a “strict order.” 803 F.3d at 1039-40, 1042.
Here, however, it was undisputed that Oracle had an unlimited number
of ways to write and organize the ideas in its code, such that functional
considerations did not dictate the specific expression Oracle chose.
Supra 4. Bikram’s did not call into question the Ninth Circuit’s
Johnson Controls decision—ignored by Google and its amici—that
software code is copyrightable whenever it “qualifies as an expression of

12
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an idea.” 886 F.2d at 1175-76 (emphasis added). Google instead relies
on a portion of Birkam’s that holds the yoga sequence could not qualify
for copyright protection as a compilation under § 103(a), when this case
is not about compilations.1
Lastly, Google argues that the panel misapplied the merger
doctrine, which precludes copyright protection where the idea and
expression “merge[].” Pet. 11. It reasons that “[i]f Google did not use
the API’s declarations … programmers could not have used the familiar
shorthand commands” that Oracle made so popular. Id. But the panel
followed Ninth Circuit law holding that the merger analysis applies “at
the time of creation [by Oracle], not at the time of infringement [by
Google].” Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1361 (citing Apple Comput., Inc. v.
Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1984)).

The panel explained why the First Circuit’s Lotus decision is
consistent with its copyrightability holding. Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1365.
Moreover, any conflict would be irrelevant because Ninth Circuit law
governs here.

1

13
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III. The Panel’s Fair-Use Decision Does Not Warrant
Rehearing.
A.

The standard of review in the Ninth Circuit does not
warrant rehearing.

The panel correctly reviewed “the ultimate determination of fair
use” “de novo.” Pet. 12. The controlling law is clear: “the ultimate
conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts [in a fair use
case] ... are legal in nature.” Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir.
1986); accord Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 560 (1985) (“Where the district court has found facts sufficient to
evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate court … may
conclude as a matter of law that the challenged use does not qualify as
a fair use ….”). The panel thoroughly explained how the recent
Supreme Court bankruptcy decision U.S. Bank further supports de novo
review. Op. 19-20. This Court should not sit en banc to predict how the
Ninth Circuit would apply U.S. Bank.
Google mischaracterizes the panel decision when it asserts that
the panel “adopted as fact a large number of disputed Oracle
assertions.” Pet. 13. The panel explicitly “resolved all factual issues
relating to the historical facts in favor of the verdict.” Op. 25. Google’s

14
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fact-specific contention to the contrary is not worthy of en banc review.
Regardless, it fails because most of Google’s examples are unsupported
by the record citations this Court needs to assess its argument. See Pet.
14 n.2. Where Google does offer citations, there is no material dispute.
Taking Google’s three examples (at 13-14) in order: Google’s witnesses
testified that Java SE was in a modern smartphone, Oracle Reply 13;
caselaw establishes that unauthorized use weighs against fair use even
if the work is free, id. at 44; and Google conceded that “only” 170 lines
of code were “technically necessary” to use the Java language, Oral Arg.
at 24:45-25:30.
B.

The panel’s sound application of Ninth Circuit
transformative-use law does not warrant rehearing.

The panel correctly held that Google’s copying is nontransformative under Ninth Circuit law. Op. 30-39. The panel applied
the established test: “[a] use is ‘transformative’ if it ‘adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning or message.’” Op. 30 (emphasis added)
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
The panel correctly found that Google’s use failed that test. Every line
of code Google copied into Android serves the same purpose and
15
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communicates the same message as the original code. “Google made no
alteration to the expressive content or message of the copyrighted
material.” Op. 33.
Google contends the panel erred in concluding “Google’s use was
not transformative primarily because … the copied declarations …
serve ‘an identical function and purpose’ in Android.” Pet. 15. But
copying a work and using it for the same purpose as the original
“seriously weakens [the] claimed fair use.” Op. 31 (quoting Worldwide
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2000)). Moreover, the panel’s holding rests on Google’s failure to
alter the work’s expression or meaning, not on an absolute rule that
“similarity of uses and functions” can never be transformative. Pet. 15.
Citing Sony, the panel recognized that copying code for a similar
purpose can be “modestly transformative” when done to learn about the
“unprotected” ideas in a computer program in order to create “a wholly
new product” with “entirely new … code.” Op. 34 (citing Sony). But,
unlike Sony, Google copied protected expression, not to reverse
engineer, but to put the copied code directly into a competing
commercial product. Id.

16
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Google’s inability to explain how it changed the meaning or
message communicated by Oracle’s code is also why the panel correctly
concluded that it was “irrelevant” that Google wrote its own
implementing code. Pet. 16. Google made “no suggestion that the new
implementing code somehow changed the expression or message of the
declaring code.” Op. 36.
Google argues the panel “erred by focusing on transformation of
the declarations, as opposed to” Java and Android “as a whole.” Pet. 16.
But the panel thoroughly compared Oracle’s and Google’s works and
rejected Google’s argument. Op. 36-37. It found undisputed evidence
established that Java and Android shared the same purpose. Id. (“the
record showed that Java SE APIs were in smartphones before Android
entered the market”).
In any event, Google is wrong about the proper focus. Oracle
Reply 16-17. Congress directed courts to determine “the purpose and
character of the use,” meaning the infringing use of the copyrighted
material that the defendant seeks to establish as fair. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(emphasis added). Thus, in Campbell, the Supreme Court focused on
how the new work changed the meaning of the copied verses by using
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them as part of a “play on words” with “juxtapos[ition]” to “comment on
the naiveté of the original.” 510 U.S. at 582-83 (citation omitted). That
is also how the Ninth Circuit analyzes transformative use. See Dr.
Seuss, Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing use of the expropriated elements of the
original in the new work: “the Cat’s stove-pipe hat, the narrator, and
the title.”); accord TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 180
(2d Cir. 2016).
At bottom, Google’s argument rests on the assertion that under
the panel’s approach “virtually no use of any element of a computer
program could ever be transformative.” Pet. 15. But the panel said it
did “not conclude that a fair use defense could never be sustained in an
action involving the copying of computer code.” Op. 54 (citing Sega and
Sony). More importantly, it has never been fair to copy a work and put
it to the exact same use at the expense of the original. Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 550.
C.

The panel did not overlook arguments.

Google complains that the panel overlooked its argument that its
use was fair because “a ‘reasonable copyright owner’ would have
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consented to the use.” Pet. 18 (citation omitted). The panel quoted this
very argument, Op. 17, and properly rejected it, Op. 41.
Amici also complain about ignored arguments. But Google
“abandoned the arguments” about “interoperability” that amici press.
Op. 47 n.11. Google likewise disclaimed its amici’s arguments about
factor 2’s importance, telling the panel “market harm is the most
important factor.” Google Br. 68. The panel nonetheless acknowledged
that “functional considerations were both substantial and important”
and gave that consideration due weight, resolving factor 2 in Google’s
favor. Op. 44.
IV.

There Is No Urgency To Rehear This Case.
Google and its amici raise alarms about dire consequences. They

concede that “software can generally be protected by copyright.” Pet. 5.
Yet they insist that the panel upset settled “law … recogniz[ing] … that
[software developers] are free to use existing computer software
interfaces.” Pet. 3. But they cite no case that has ever held it is
permissible to copy thousands of lines of code into a competing product
that supersedes the original in the marketplace.
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Nor did the panel make grand pronouncements about the
copyrightability of interfaces or “the basic building blocks of computer
design and programming.” Pet. 20-21. Some interfaces may be devoid
of expression and thus not copyrightable. The panel painstakingly
assessed the unique work here on the specific record before it, according
to basic copyright principles.
The panel’s adherence to settled law also refutes Google’s
assertion that the decision will cause “crippling liability and … new
barriers to innovation” for the software industry. Pet. 19-20. Google
made the same dire warning to the Supreme Court four years ago, see
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 14410, 2014 WL 5319724 at *36, yet offers not a shred of proof that its
doomsday scenario has transpired. To the contrary, software
innovation has thrived since then. See BSA Foundation, The Growing
$1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software (Sept. 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y77xjgke.
Google’s doomsday scenario is unfounded. Under the panel
decision, app developers may continue to use the Java APIs for free.
The decision merely prohibits what only Google has done: copying
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Oracle’s work into a competing commercial platform without abiding by
Oracle’s licensing scheme. Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1360 n.5. Allowing
such plagiarism is what would constitute a “devastating” blow to “the
computer software industry.” Pet. 3.
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny Google’s petition.
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